Field notes The Energy Transition for the Rest of Us

Catalyst N° 119 of 125 30 Jul 2026

Why C&I storage is finally taking off

with Tim Hade, senior vice president, Voltus; previously co-founder and CEO, Brightfield Infrastructure

In this note
  1. 01The question
  2. 02The answer
  3. 03The argument
  4. 04What you need to know first
  5. 05Details worth keeping
  6. 06Claims worth citing
  7. 07Where it’s contested

The question

Commercial and industrial storage, meaning batteries installed at a business’s own site, has never gone anywhere. Is that actually changing, and why would this time be different?

The answer

Not in the deployment numbers, not yet. By Hade’s own figures, commercial and industrial, or C&I, accounts for essentially none of the 40 gigawatts of storage the US grid added in five years. What has changed, mostly in the last 18 months, are the inputs: a fourth revenue stream in capacity that barely existed before, a federal storage tax credit that survived when others did not, hardware down 30 to 40%, and AI cutting the transaction-cost slice of his own projects by three quarters or more. The claim in the title is a forecast built on those inputs, and Hade narrows it under questioning to fastest growth rate off a near-zero base, not fastest growth in megawatts.

03The argument

Kann sets the episode up with a cautionary history. In the mid-2000s the US solar market was mostly commercial and industrial, and the first big acquisition in the space was SunPower buying PowerLight, a C&I developer, for $330 million in 2007. Then residential solar scaled, utility-scale solar scaled, and C&I simply did not. Storage has so far repeated the pattern exactly: under 2 gigawatts on the US grid going into 2020, about 40 gigawatts by 2025, of which roughly 90% is utility scale and 10% residential, which as Hade points out leaves basically nothing for C&I. His diagnosis is that the residential share is not purely an economic decision, since much of it is bought for resilience, whereas C&I customers buy on economics alone and the economics were not good enough. The pioneers of the 2015-2020 era, Stem, Green Charge, AMS, went after demand charge management and sometimes came close to penciling, but the value proposition was an edge case that mostly needed state subsidy to work. His phrase for the average customer is that the juice was not worth the squeeze: you could build an NPV-positive project, and the bill savings still were not large enough to justify the time a business would have to spend on something that was never going to save the business.

On the revenue side, Hade counts four streams, and Kann inserts an important qualifier before he starts: rising retail rates are inherently good for behind-the-meter generation but not inherently good for storage, because what matters is how the rates are structured. Time-of-use arbitrage now exists in many utility territories where it did not a decade ago. Demand charges, the part of a commercial bill set by the single highest power draw rather than by total energy, have been rising faster than the energy component, which makes shaving them worth more. Ancillary services, once the whole market, are now a minor share. The fourth, capacity, is the one Hade says has changed most in 18 months: PJM capacity prices are up elevenfold in three years, and the auction has hit its price cap without clearing for several rounds running, which he describes flatly as a market not functioning properly. That dysfunction is precisely what creates the opening, because hyperscalers can contract bilaterally for capacity outside the capped auction and pay whatever they think an incremental megawatt is worth. Kann then presses the counterargument, that storage erodes its own revenue: in ERCOT the arbitrage spread has been flat to declining because so many batteries were built, and on a recent record net-load day 10 gigawatts of batteries dispatched and prices never cleared $250 a megawatt-hour. Hade concedes the point and generalizes it into the episode’s sharpest unresolved problem. Storage has demonstrably helped every grid where it has been deployed at scale, and in the markets where it helped most it has not necessarily been a good investment. He says market design has to fix that over the next five to ten years and that we are not there yet.

The cost side is where his case is strongest and also where measured results and forecasts have to be separated carefully. A typical C&I battery today runs about $800 per kilowatt-hour after the tax credit: $300 to $400 of hardware, about $100 of software, about $200 of installation and about $200 of transaction costs, meaning interconnection, permitting, financing, customer acquisition and the people who do all of it. The tax credit itself is the first piece of good news, 30% at base, plus 10% for domestic content and another 10% in an energy community, so up to 50%, and it came through the 2025 budget law unchanged when the solar and wind credits did not. Hardware is the second, down about 40% at the pack level and 30% at the system level in 18 months. But soft costs are the historical killer, because a C&I project carries roughly utility-scale complexity amortized over a far smaller asset, and this is where Hade’s specific bet lives: transaction costs are repetitive workflows, financial modeling, contracts, interconnection filings, and agents can be trained to do them. Projects his team runs today cost $25 to $50 per kilowatt-hour in that bucket against $200 historically, and he adds that they are not even good at this yet. He forecasts about $20 within three years. Installation he is visibly less confident about, calling it harder to predict and offering a learning-curve argument: today you pay an electrician both to learn how to install a C&I battery and to install it, and as volume arrives that halves, to maybe $100 over five years. Put together, $800 becomes something like $510, which he thinks pushes many more customers past the threshold where this gets interesting. His heuristic there is worth carrying: 5% off a customer’s net electricity spend makes the conversation worth having, above 10% is a really good project, and rising rates have moved the pitch from vitamin to painkiller.

The claim that C&I grows fastest does not rest on C&I being good. It rests on utility-scale being stuck. A new utility-scale battery joins the same interconnection queue as large loads, and Hade puts the average wait at about six years in PJM, maybe nine in CAISO and maybe four in ERCOT, so demand for batteries over the next three to five years has to be met behind the meter, where interconnection is fast. Kann’s objection is the obvious one and Hade does not answer it: the queue is long precisely because it is full of storage projects, and those will eventually come online too. The remaining problem is scale. Hyperscalers think in gigawatts, and a single one-megawatt commercial site is irrelevant to them, while a thousand of them is a competitive advantage. Bridging that gap is aggregation into a virtual power plant, which is why Hade’s company ended up inside Voltus, and it is also the part he explicitly says he does not understand, suggesting his boss come on the show to explain how bring-your-own capacity actually works. Underneath all of it sits an unresolved hardware gap in exactly the size range most C&I facilities need, which he can only say he hopes more manufacturers fill.

04What you need to know first

C&I
Commercial and industrial: a battery or solar system at a business site, historically hundreds of kilowatts to a megawatt or two. Bigger than a house, far smaller than a power plant, and awkward in both directions.
Demand charge
The portion of a commercial electricity bill set by the single highest rate of power draw during the billing period rather than by total energy used. A battery can discharge into that peak and cut the charge without changing how much electricity the business consumes.
Capacity, and bring-your-own capacity
Capacity is payment for being available at peak, separate from payment for energy delivered. Bring-your-own capacity is the arrangement where a data center developer must supply capacity to the grid to get connected, and can buy it bilaterally rather than through a price-capped auction.
The investment tax credit
A federal credit worth a percentage of a project’s capital cost. The speakers refer to the two laws involved only as the IRA and the OBBB and never expand either acronym; what matters here is that the storage credit carried over unchanged when the later law passed on 4 July 2025.

05Details worth keeping

  • The solar precedent that frames the episode: SunPower’s $330 million acquisition of PowerLight in 2007 was the first big deal in US solar and PowerLight was a C&I developer. Kann notes in passing that PowerLight’s president, Dan Sugar, is now CEO of NexTracker.
  • Where early C&I storage did work, it was subsidy or incident driven. Hade cites California’s state-level incentives and Southern California Edison’s Load Control Response program, which came out of the Aliso Canyon gas leak and needed a lot of storage on the grid quickly.
  • The hardware gap is specific. Residential blocks of roughly 10 kilowatts can be stacked to serve a 70 to 100 kilowatt facility, and utility-scale one-megawatt blocks serve anything above a megawatt. Between 100 kilowatts and one megawatt, where most C&I facilities sit, the product range is thin, though Hade names Socomec and Sungrow as good providers there and says those products have seen the same cost declines as the rest.
  • Customer acquisition cost is really a measure of how hard the thing is to sell. Ten years ago Hade had to price the nineteen wasted sales trips into the one deal that signed, and he says he was good at it.
  • A quieter change he credits the industry with: contracts are simpler and clearer, economics are more transparent to the buyer, and project finance for these assets has gone from one-off structuring to a standard offering. Since the binding constraint for a business is often management time rather than money, and since a battery is never going to save a struggling company, that reduction in effort matters as much as the savings number.

06Claims worth citing

All figures as stated on 2026-07-30. Battery hardware prices, capacity prices and interconnection queue times are all fast-moving, and the cost reductions Hade reports on transaction costs are measured on his own company’s projects rather than industry-wide.

  • Less than 2 gigawatts of total storage on the US grid going into 2020; about 40 gigawatts as of 2025, roughly 90% utility scale and 10% residential, leaving effectively nothing for C&I. Hade
  • PJM capacity prices up 11x in the last 36 months, with the auction hitting its price cap and failing to clear needed capacity for several auctions running. Hade
  • Average interconnection wait for a new utility-scale battery: about six years in PJM, maybe nine in CAISO, maybe four in ERCOT, in the same queue as large loads. Hade
  • Storage investment tax credit: 30% base, plus a 10% domestic content adder, plus a 10% energy community adder, so up to 50%, unchanged from the IRA to the OBBB, which passed 4 July 2025. Neither acronym is expanded on air. Hade, with Kann noting it outlasts the solar and wind credits
  • Battery costs down about 40% at the pack level and about 30% at the system level over 18 months, which he qualifies as depending on which analysis you look at. Hade
  • Typical C&I project about $800 per kilowatt-hour post-tax-credit: $300 to $400 hardware, about $100 software, about $200 installation, about $200 transaction. Note that he rounds hardware plus software to $400, so the components do not add up exactly. Hade
  • Transaction costs on his own current projects: $25 to $50 per kilowatt-hour against $200 historically. Hade
  • Forecasts: transaction costs to about $20 per kilowatt-hour within three years, a roughly 90% reduction credited primarily to AI and agentic tooling; installation halved to about $100 over five years; all-in cost to roughly $510. He calls the total his best guess and the installation number harder to predict, and the components sum slightly above the $510 he quotes. Hade
  • Customer threshold heuristic: 5% off net electricity spend is worth a conversation, above 10% is a really good project. Hade
  • Customer acquisition hit rate roughly 5% ten years ago, maybe 30% now. Hade
  • On a record ERCOT net load day, 10 gigawatts of batteries dispatched and prices stayed under $250 per megawatt-hour. Kann
  • Forecasts: C&I becomes the fastest-growing segment of the storage market over three to five years, by growth rate rather than by total megawatts; and bring-your-own capacity becomes a very quickly growing segment over the next 36 to 48 months, because hyperscalers in constrained regions like PJM have nowhere else to get near-term capacity. Hade

07Where it’s contested

  • The title’s premise is the main thing to hold onto. Nothing in the episode shows C&I storage taking off in deployment; the same speaker who makes the case supplies the number showing C&I at essentially zero percent of five years of US additions. What is measured is the change in inputs, cost, tax treatment and capacity value. What is forecast is the deployment.
  • The growth claim narrows under pressure. Kann immediately notes that fastest growth from a small base is easy, and asks whether he means total megawatts. Hade says no, he means the rate. That concession should travel with the claim.
  • Market design is unsolved and Hade says so. Grid operators have benefited from storage everywhere it has been deployed at scale, and the people who installed it in the markets where it helped most have not necessarily been rewarded. His answer is that rules have to change over five to ten years, and “I don’t think we’re there yet.”
  • Storage erodes its own arbitrage. Kann’s ERCOT example is a genuine counterweight to the revenue case, partially offset in his own telling by expected load growth in Texas. The arbitrage value is a function of how many batteries are already there, not only of how peaky the market is.
  • The interconnection argument cuts both ways. Kann points out that queues are long precisely because they are stuffed with storage projects that will eventually connect, which weakens the claim that only behind-the-meter storage can move over the next three to five years. Hade does not rebut it and the conversation moves on.
  • Rising rates are not automatically good for batteries. Kann’s qualifier, and Hade does not dispute it: rate structure determines whether a battery earns anything, so the retail price trend alone proves nothing.
  • Installation cost is the weak leg of the cost forecast, by Hade’s own admission, and it rests on a learning-curve argument rather than on anything demonstrated. The hardware gap between 100 kilowatts and one megawatt is similarly unresolved, and he describes the fix as something he hopes happens.
  • He disclaims the aggregation piece entirely. Asked how bring-your-own capacity actually works, Hade says he does not get it and suggests his boss at Voltus come on the show to explain, while describing his own job as building as many one-megawatt projects as possible.
  • The disclosure, stated plainly. EIP co-led the seed round in the guest’s company, which Voltus then acquired, and Kann says he is an erstwhile investor; Hade closes with warm remarks about EIP and Kann jokes about a bribe check. This is routine for the show. The narrow consequence is that the striking transaction-cost reduction is a company-reported figure from a company selling the service, not an independently measured industry number.

Cite as: “Why C&I storage is finally taking off,” The Energy Transition for the Rest of Us, note on Catalyst with Shayle Kann, July 30, 2026. CC BY 4.0. View the Markdown