Catalyst N° 020 of 125 14 Mar 2024
Climate tech’s tough year in the public markets
with Shanu Mathew, portfolio manager and research analyst, Lazard
In this note
The question
Almost every climate tech market kept growing through 2023, so why did climate tech stocks fall so far behind the broader market?
The answer
Because equities price changes in expectations and the cost of capital, not the level of deployment. The three things that inflated these valuations through 2021 were cheap money, a European energy price spike and the arrival of new subsidies, and all three normalized at once while growth rates decelerated from extraordinary to merely strong. Underneath that, Mathew’s recurring point is that secular growth in a subsector does not mean every company in its value chain captures the value, which is why performance within solar and within lithium diverged sharply.
03The argument
The gap is large and multi-year, not a bad quarter. Over the prior two years the S&P 500 was up 23% while the MAC Global Solar Index was down 34% and the S&P Global Clean Energy Index down 25%, which Mathew calls 40 to 50 points of underperformance. But the preceding five years had produced a run-up driven more by expanding valuation multiples than by earnings, on very low interest rates, high energy prices from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and COVID supply chain disruption, and the arrival of subsidy regimes. Much of the fall since is those conditions reversing rather than the businesses failing, and he adds a fourth reversal: cheaper energy weakens the payback case for heat pumps, solar and EVs, while normalized lead times leave the channel with inventory to work through.
Rates hit these companies harder than the market for two specific reasons, and both are about where the cash sits in time. Anything bought at a consumer point of purchase with borrowed money, a rooftop solar system or a car, gets more expensive when rates rise, and Mathew puts the effect concretely: a payback period that was seven years becomes ten or more, which changes the purchase decision. Separately, capital-intensive companies borrow to fund their own build-out, so they pay more interest, and they tend to be valued on cash flows three, five or ten years out, which a higher discount rate compresses much harder than it compresses the value of a company earning money today.
What then hurt the equities was not contraction but deceleration, and the EV and lithium chains show it cleanly. Global EV growth, counting battery-electric and plug-in hybrids, ran at 100%, then 64%, then 33%, with forecasters expecting closer to 20% next. That is still growth; it is also a falling growth rate, and Mathew says the real repricing came from forecasts of 50% penetration by 2027 or 2028 sliding out to 2030 or beyond as manufacturers pulled their volume targets. Lithium is the same story amplified by a commodity cycle: prices went from under $10,000 per metric ton before the EV boom to $80,000 at the peak and back to roughly $13,500 to $15,000, and the reason is supply, which grew 30% to 40% last year and is expected to do so again against demand growth of about 20%. Kann pushes back that the decade-long demand case has not disappeared, and Mathew agrees it has not, then redirects: the market is in surplus now, most sell-side forecasters still expect a deficit by the end of the decade, and whether the surplus clears quickly depends on how fast producers cancel capital projects.
The within-sector point is the one Mathew says he repeats most, that a strong subsector does not distribute its value evenly. Solar is his example, and it splits twice. Utility-scale grew 50% to 60% in 2023, mostly catching up from a 2022 depressed by regulatory delay, but the companies without delays are guiding to about 20% growth and trading several multiple points above peers guiding to high single digits, with interconnection, permitting and transformer problems doing the sorting. Residential is the genuine downturn: after roughly 30% annual growth, 2024 estimates range from down 15% to slightly positive, because California changed its net metering rules and is 40% of the US residential market, and because distributors over-ordered during the shortage and are now sitting on six to twelve months of inventory. That shows up in the accounts as SolarEdge going from nearly $1 billion in quarterly revenue to $300 million. So the money that wants climate exposure has moved twice: toward the companies inside the sector that are executing, and, more so in his observation, outward toward climate-adjacent incumbents such as electrical equipment and HVAC makers (Eaton, Hubbell, nVent, Trane), where a legacy cash flow stream comes with underappreciated decarbonization tailwinds and fewer swings.
04What you need to know first
- Multiple expansion
- A stock rising because investors will pay more per dollar of earnings, rather than because earnings grew. Mathew’s account of the run-up and the fall is largely about this, which is why deployment can keep rising while the stock falls.
- Discount rate
- The rate at which a future dollar is converted into a present-day valuation. Raise it and distant cash flows lose more value than near ones, which is why pre-profit, capital-heavy companies fall hardest when rates rise.
- De-stocking
- Buyers running down existing inventory instead of ordering new product. Orders to the manufacturer collapse for a period even if end demand is merely flat, which is the mechanism behind the residential solar revenue drops.
- ITC and PTC
- The investment tax credit and production tax credit, the two long-standing US subsidies for renewable generation. Mathew separates these, which have survived administrations of both parties, from newer credits that investors treat as more exposed.
05Details worth keeping
- Defining the category is itself hard. Mathew describes a tiered market of climate solutions funds, broader sustainability funds and the wider ESG umbrella, and notes that ESG is technically a toolkit for analyzing non-financial factors rather than a climate stance. Kann describes EIP building its own index and getting stuck on whether to include utilities and conglomerates.
- The scarcity of pure plays is what drives the reach for incumbents: 50 to 100 US names is too concentrated to build a portfolio from.
- The IRA’s passage in 2022 is the cleanest natural experiment in the episode: cleantech equities were down 20% to 40% year to date before it passed and many jumped 20% to 30% in the week it did.
- Mathew disagrees that investors are treating election risk indiscriminately. He says buyers are probability-weighting scenarios by subsector and separating credits likely to survive from those that are not, while conceding some will decide the sector is too complicated to touch.
- Kann states at the top that nothing in the conversation is investment advice.
06Claims worth citing
All figures as stated on 2024-03-14. Index performance, commodity prices and growth forecasts in this episode change week to week, and several are explicitly approximate or personal observations.
- Two-year performance to the recording: S&P 500 up 23%, MAC Global Solar Index down 34%, S&P Global Clean Energy Index down 25%, which he characterizes as 40 to 50% underperformance. Mathew
- Roughly $2 trillion of global assets under management in ESG-type funds, about 80% of it in European capital markets, with climate roughly 10% or more of that and the largest single subsector within it. Morningstar, cited by Mathew
- The US pure-play climate technology and climate services universe is roughly 50 to 100 names, offered as a rough approximation. Mathew
- Higher rates have moved consumer payback periods from around seven years to ten or more. Mathew
- Cleantech equities were down 20% to 40% year to date in 2022 before the IRA passed, and many rose 20% to 30% in the week of its passage. Mathew
- Global EV growth, battery-electric plus plug-in hybrid: 100% in 2020 to 2021, 64% in 2021 to 2022, 33% last year, with forecasters closer to 20% ahead. BloombergNEF, Rho Motion and S&P Global Mobility, cited by Mathew
- Forecasts of 50% EV penetration by 2027 or 2028 have moved out to 2030 or beyond. Mathew
- Lithium: under $10,000 per metric ton pre-COVID, up to $80,000 at the 2020 to 2022 peak, currently about $13,500 to $15,000 on China spot and ticking up. The transcript garbles the unit mid-sentence before he corrects to metric tons. Mathew
- Lithium supply grew 30% to 40% last year against demand growth of 30% to 35%, and is expected to grow 30% to 40% again against roughly 20% demand growth, leaving what most sell-side banks call a 5% to 15% oversupply on a market of about 1.2 to 1.3 million tons of lithium carbonate equivalent. Most expect a return to deficit by the end of the decade on 15% to 20% annual demand growth. sell-side bank forecasts, cited by Mathew
- Albemarle, SQM and Arcadium Lithium are off 40% to 50% or more in some cases, and tier-one producers with the lowest-cost assets in the world have guided to negative free cash flow this year because of previously committed capital spending. Mathew
- Utility-scale solar grew 50% to 60% in 2023 against a 2022 depressed by regulatory and legislative delays. Nextracker and the EPC firm Quanta are guiding to roughly 20%, or 20% to 30%, growth; peers are guiding to high single digits or 10% on interconnection, permitting and transformer delays. Mathew
- US residential solar grew at roughly a 30% compound annual rate from 2020 to 2023, a figure he prefaces with “I believe.” 2024 estimates run from negative 15% to flat or slightly positive, with negative 5% to negative 10% his sense of the reasonable range. Mathew
- California is 40% of the US residential solar market, and its net metering change is the main driver of the 2024 decline. Mathew
- Residential solar lead times fell from six to nine months to three or four weeks, leaving six to twelve months of inventory at customers per recent SolarEdge and Enphase earnings calls. SolarEdge went from nearly $1 billion in quarterly revenue to $300 million in the most recent quarter. Mathew
- Valuations on the clean energy indices doubled in some cases over 2020 to 2023. Mathew
07Where it’s contested
- Whether the election is being priced crudely or carefully. This is the sharpest exchange. Kann suggests a baby-with-the-bathwater effect in which fear about the election depresses the whole sector even though the actual risk is highly differentiated, including between what an administration can do alone and what requires Congress. Mathew disagrees, saying investors are getting specific at the subsector level, while flagging that he may be biased by having sat in on several sell-side calls on exactly this topic in the previous two weeks.
- And a developer’s version cuts the other way. Mathew relays an expert-network call in which a solar developer undercut the clean legal distinction: a hostile administration slows projects regardless of whether repeal is possible, and noise alone can move the growth rate investors are underwriting.
- Lithium’s long-run demand versus its near-term surplus. Kann argues the macro case that made lithium stocks darlings has not disappeared. Mathew concedes the point and reframes the disagreement as being about supply, not demand, and is explicit that how fast the surplus clears depends on capital project cancellations nobody can yet count.
- Residential solar’s bottom is genuinely unknown. Estimates for 2024 span negative 15% to slightly positive, and companies themselves disagree on whether channel inventory clears by the second quarter or by year end.
- The forward view is labeled opinion. Mathew calls his expectation of more rational valuations a personal observation, and says only that the next three to six months look stark, declining to call a turn beyond that.
- Sell-side estimates were still being revised down at the time of recording, which he offers as the best available barometer while noting that analysts systematically weight the next quarter over the next several years.