Field notes The Energy Transition for the Rest of Us

Critical Capital N° 010 of 11 1 Sep 2026

What it takes to build in America again

with Erin Price-Wright, general partner at Andreessen Horowitz, investing in energy, mining and heavy industry for the firm’s American Dynamism practice; previously an engineer at Palantir

In this note
  1. 01The question
  2. 02The answer
  3. 03The argument
  4. 04What you need to know first
  5. 05Details worth keeping
  6. 06Claims worth citing
  7. 07Where it’s contested

The question

Now that capital has arrived for factories, mines and grid hardware, what actually decides whether they get built in the United States?

The answer

Price-Wright’s answer is certainty. Money is available at both ends of a project’s life, venture equity for the first plant and project finance once there is a track record, so what decides outcomes is whether a builder gets a definitive regulatory answer in a predictable time and can rely on it afterwards; she is explicit that this means a timely and final yes or no written into law rather than executive action, and that she is not arguing to get rid of all regulation. Two practical constraints sit underneath: the grid’s limit is moving power and the equipment that carries it rather than generating it, and a project needs the community it lands in to want it.

03The argument

She starts with why the capital showed up. The category was lonely well over five years ago and now the water is warm, on what she calls a few different tailwinds. The first is bipartisan recognition that the country has to build again, felt through an aging grid, rising electricity prices and the difficulty of siting any new industrial facility, and including the realization of dependence on foreign adversaries for the large majority of critical materials and components. The second is proof that the returns exist, which she attributes to Palantir’s share price, Anduril’s performance and a SpaceX public offering that gave a long-illiquid class of investors a large exit. To that she adds the strategic case: in the age of AI, physical plant is a moat precisely because it is expensive and slow, since it is not easy for OpenAI or Anthropic to release a new model that suddenly displaces a factory.

Her correction to the intuitive picture of the grid is the sharpest technical turn in the episode. The instinct is that bigger is better and the country needs enormous new plants, nuclear or gas. She says the bottleneck is not generation at all but getting power from where it is made to where it is used, which makes the real obstacle transmission and the grid interconnection. You could build as many large gas plants as you like and still be stuck. That reverses what counts as good technology. The distributed home batteries her firm backs in Base Power substitute thousands of small sites for a single point of failure. Smaller nuclear reactors may not be optimized for price per unit of electricity but are optimized for speed to power, built the way a car or a prefabricated home is built, and sited where the power is needed so that no interconnection queue applies at the point of generation. The same logic runs into hardware. The grid runs on technology invented in the 1940s and 1950s and deployed in the 1970s, now at end of life, heavy, and supplied by only a handful of makers worldwide. Her stronger claim is that this equipment is not merely old but mute, so the system is run essentially blind, with no ability to observe or control it. Her answer is Heron Power, Drew Baglino’s company, whose thesis she states as taking the technology developed at Tesla, first for the vehicle powertrain and then for Tesla Energy, and scaling it up for the grid itself, starting with how data centers and generation projects connect to it. Its solid-state transformers swap the large drums of oil for silicon carbide, which she describes as software instead of hardware for managing electricity flow.

The financing picture follows the same shape: no shortage of money, a shortage of the conditions money needs. The first plant, what she calls factory zero, is often funded with venture dollars, which are genuinely available right now. She is blunt that this is the most expensive capital a founder can use, since it trades away future cash flow and equity, and that it should not fund every subsequent dollar in the ground. Project finance arrives later, once there are customer deposits and a demonstrated ability to build to a timeline, and large credit funds are now buying into earlier equity rounds to position themselves as the long-term partner. The gap in the middle is the host’s framing: he puts almost unlimited capital behind the very large, utility-sized project with high-quality offtake and asks about the space in between, and she agrees in four words before putting it in her own weaker terms, that there is still a bit of a gap. Founders fill it with more venture, which she says is not necessarily the most efficient way to do it. Her diagnosis of why credit does not fill it is about credibility rather than risk appetite. Founders are telling conservative credit investors a story that sounds unbelievable against their experience: that AI can get a permit in six months instead of eighteen, that it can project-manage ten thousand contractors, that a project can come in ahead of schedule and under budget. She notes that the last phrase has dropped out of the American industrial vocabulary because the country has not done it in decades. Hence her view that a first finance chief who can translate technology-driven speed to a traditional finance audience is a very hard role to hire for.

That leads to the claim the episode is built around. Underwriting a business is mostly about certainty, and in these categories the uncertainty is regulatory. She is careful to say that regulations exist for a reason and that she is not arguing to get rid of all regulation. What she wants is that a business meeting the letter of the law gets a definitive answer in a reasonable period, and that the answer is final, with a limitation period so that it is not relitigated in court afterwards. Today, she says, a large industrial project can simply never get an answer, bounced between bodies for years, and that delay is what materially damages the return. Her conclusion is that this matters more than any particular financing tool the government holds, and that both the current and previous administrations have acted through executive authority when the durable version has to be codified in law so builders can plan across ten and twenty years rather than two. The extension beyond permits is the social license. Mariana Minerals, her mining portfolio company, worked with public high schools, local community colleges and community centers before it needed to, and she reframes the jobs comparison that gets made against it: the honest baseline is not the roughly 300 people the mine employed at its historical peak but the zero it employed after going bankrupt. Site selection follows the same logic. A factory zero gains from sitting next to its engineers, which for many of her companies still means California. But expansion is moving out of the state quickly and some companies have opted out of it altogether, Base Power building in Texas. The regions that solve grid modernization, cost allocation and training pipelines are the ones she expects to win the next twenty years.

04What you need to know first

Factory zero
Her term for a company’s first plant, the one built to learn on. It is funded differently from everything after it, with venture equity rather than project debt, because there is no track record yet to lend against.
Project finance and offtake
Lending against a specific asset’s future cash flows rather than against a company. It needs predictable timing, which is why delay hurts it disproportionately, and it is easiest when a creditworthy buyer has already contracted to take the output.
Grid interconnection
The physical and administrative process of attaching a new plant or large load to the grid. Her argument is that this, rather than the ability to generate power, is where projects actually stall, which is what makes small units sited near demand attractive despite worse unit economics.
Electric steel and solid-state transformers
Transformers step voltage up and down along the grid and are built from many tons of a specialized steel with a single domestic producer. The alternative she backs, from Heron Power, replaces the large drums of oil with silicon carbide, which she describes as software in place of hardware for managing electricity flow.

05Details worth keeping

  • The running metaphor is a quote she credits to Zach Dell, the chief executive of Base Power, that there are no sexy electrons, no electron being better than another. The host quarrels that a sexy electron is one delivered fast and cheap; she accepts and adds reliable, then notes that the answer differs for Guam, an army base in Alaska and the city of Austin.
  • She prefers new mines to be built domestically on the argument that strong environmental and labor regulation makes them cleaner and safer, and states this as a preference rather than a finding. She also says mining and refining technology has advanced enough to make domestic mining cost-competitive.
  • On allies she is unambiguous that the problem cannot be solved inside the United States alone. If lithium’s buyers are largely Korean or Japanese conglomerates who assemble the battery packs, she says, designing offtake agreements to damp price volatility becomes a State Department-level question. Her goal is stated as self-determination and bargaining chips rather than self-sufficiency.
  • On government tools she names loan programs, tax credits and incentives, and says some are being used and some could be used more. The host adds the federal equity stake in MP Materials, a rare earth company, as another instrument.
  • Beyond Texas she singles out Utah and Arizona as strong partners and says California still has a lot to figure out. The host notes that Governor Abbott was at data center openings not long ago and that there is now talk of a moratorium on new data centers in Texas.
  • Her closing case is distributional. The software era left a large part of the country better off as consumers but not in the bottom line of their lives, and she expects a twenty-year industrial build-out to reach people with no connection to technology and no coastal address.

06Claims worth citing

All figures as stated on 2026-09-01. Permitting timelines, factory schedules and capital-market conditions are the fastest-moving of these and will date first.

  • The United States relies on foreign adversaries for more than 90% of the critical materials and components used day to day, including refined copper and rare earths. She restates it later as 90% of the critical things needed in daily life, and the adversary turns singular in the restatement, a large global adversary she goes on to name as China. The base for the percentage is left loose in both versions. Price-Wright
  • Around 70% of critical minerals in key categories are mined in China and more than 90% are refined there. This figure is the host’s, offered in a question, and the guest does not repeat or confirm it. Johnson
  • Mariana Minerals was told that federal permits to expand its southeast Utah copper mine should take 18 to 24 months; they took six. She credits the focus of the Department of the Interior and the Department of Energy, and says the review was still thorough and detailed. Price-Wright
  • That mine employed something like 300 people at its operating peak, which she flags she is not sure of, then zero after bankruptcy, and Mariana Minerals has something like 150 people there today, close to its pre-expansion maximum. Price-Wright
  • A nuclear approval application runs to thousands of pages, and a single misplaced period can send it back, costing about six months. Price-Wright
  • AI can cut a permit from eighteen months to six, and project-manage ten thousand contractors on a build. She presents these as the claims founders are making to credit investors, says her portfolio companies are starting to deliver ahead of schedule and under budget, and offers board meetings rather than data as evidence. Price-Wright
  • Grid technology was invented in the 1940s and 1950s and deployed in the 1970s, and is reaching end of life. Earlier in the conversation she dates the installed equipment simply to the 1970s. Price-Wright
  • There is one producer of electric steel in the United States, and about ten other pieces of grid equipment have similarly limited supply chains with only a couple of makers worldwide. Price-Wright
  • The vast majority of the world’s battery cells are manufactured in China, and most of the remainder in Korea or Vietnam. Price-Wright
  • Close to ten companies in the American Dynamism portfolio are now based in Texas. Price-Wright
  • Heron Power’s solid-state transformers are expected off the production line next year from a newly announced California factory. This is a company schedule, not a shipped product. Price-Wright

07Where it’s contested

Nothing substantive is contested. The single disagreement is a friendly one over a metaphor, where the host amends the claim that no electron is better than another, and the guest accepts the amendment and extends it. What follows is where the argument is load-bearing and untested.

  • Almost every piece of evidence is a portfolio company. Base Power, Mariana Minerals and Heron Power are all investments of the guest’s firm, which the host states plainly in the introduction. The argument is a venture thesis told by the investor who holds it, and the operating figures inside it are the companies’ own. The exceptions are Palantir, Anduril and SpaceX, the outside proof points she cites for the category’s returns, and the nuclear paperwork example.
  • The episode’s packaging is stronger than the guest. The show notes say the cost of money no longer sets the return on an industrial project and that waiting on a regulator does. The host’s monologue is more careful, saying the constraint is no longer just the cost of capital. Price-Wright is more careful still: delay materially damages a project’s return, and regulatory certainty would be worth more than any single financing tool, but she also describes venture as a founder’s highest cost of capital and treats the shape of the capital stack as a first-order problem. On her account the cost of money still sets a great deal.
  • Do not join the two permitting stories. The six-month mine permit and the claim that AI can compress permitting are made in different parts of the conversation, and she credits the permit to the agencies’ focus, not to software. Nothing in the episode says technology produced that result.
  • The AI claims carry no evidence. Nobody asks for a project, a duration or a number behind them.
  • The cost of the certainty she wants goes unexamined. She says regulations matter and that she is not arguing to get rid of all regulation, then asks for time limits on review, finality and a limitation period on challenges. What gets traded away in review quality or in the public comment process, and who decides, is never discussed.
  • Community opposition is framed as a communications problem. The remedy offered is telling the story earlier and spending money before there is a return on it, so that a community feels the company is committed. The possibility that an objection is substantive rather than a failure of storytelling does not come up.
  • The employment comparison is contested elsewhere, not here. She raises the criticism that the mine now employs half its former workforce and answers it herself, by changing the baseline.

Cite as: “What it takes to build in America again,” The Energy Transition for the Rest of Us, note on Critical Capital, September 1, 2026. CC BY 4.0. View the Markdown