Field notes The Energy Transition for the Rest of Us

Catalyst N° 089 of 125 11 Dec 2025

Can AI revolutionize EPC?

with Alex Modon, co-founder and CEO, Unlimited Industries

In this note
  1. 01The question
  2. 02The answer
  3. 03The argument
  4. 04What you need to know first
  5. 05Details worth keeping
  6. 06Claims worth citing
  7. 07Where it’s contested

The question

Big capital projects are chronically late and over budget. Can AI change that, and is engineering even where the leverage is?

The answer

The problem is contractual before it is technical: the firms that design and build these projects make money when projects cost more and take longer, and software does not change that by itself. AI matters because it can drop the marginal cost of engineering far enough to finish the design before the price is committed, which is what would make a genuinely fixed price with no change orders survivable. None of it is demonstrated; the first project is hoped for by the end of 2026.

03The argument

Start with what an engineering, procurement and construction contractor is: one firm that designs the project, runs its supply chain and builds it, engaged in a single contract after the developer has secured land, permits, power and a tenant. Modon’s complaint is that both available contract forms reward the wrong thing. Cost-plus pays a margin on whatever the project ends up costing, so the contractor earns more when the job costs more and takes longer. Fixed-firm names a price, but against a scope written tightly enough that the inevitable discoveries during design trigger change orders, which is where Modon says the margin actually gets made, negotiated when the developer can no longer walk away. He steelmans it though, and Kann presses him to: these projects run from about $100 million to several billion, involve hundreds of people, and genuinely cannot be costed accurately up front, so the flexible contract is a risk-mitigation device rather than a swindle. The misalignment worsens the more custom the project, which makes first-of-a-kind facilities the worst case and data centers bad because their interiors keep changing with chip generations and cooling choices.

The second problem is less obvious and matters more. Manufacturing has a cost per widget, so it gets a learning rate. Projects are each treated as an n of one, even a company’s tenth refinery, so nothing accumulates. Some of that is intrinsic, since every site differs, but Modon argues most is self-inflicted: because engineering has a high marginal cost, any tweak reintroduces a near-complete redesign rather than just the delta, so design learning never compounds. Kann supplies the sharpest illustration almost by accident. Modon credits solar’s cost decline to this kind of iteration, and Kann corrects him that it was module cost that fell while installed cost did not fall nearly as fast, which is the construction problem stated as a fact rather than a theory.

That sets up the actual mechanism, and it is not the one the title suggests. Engineering is only 3% to 10% or 15% of project cost, so cutting engineering fees is not the prize; spending engineering to buy certainty is. Today a conceptual design gives roughly plus or minus 50% on cost, front-end engineering narrows that to about plus or minus 10%, which is enough for a lender, and the project reaches final investment decision there with only about 30% of the engineering done. Finishing the rest first would burn development capital, and it is cheaper to spend the lender’s money later. Modon’s claim is that if engineering becomes cheap and fast enough to reach 100% definition before commitment, two things follow. You know the complete equipment and bulk materials list on the day the project is funded, so you can buy everything that day or hedge it, which removes the commodity and tariff exposure that makes contractors demand flexibility in the first place. And because you are no longer freezing design decisions early to control engineering spend, you can search a wider space instead of settling into a local optimum. Together those are what let him write contracts with no change orders and carry the overrun risk himself.

The technology claim is deliberately modest. Modon says they have not redefined engineering, they have augmented engineers so the same time and capital buys more definition. The platform is internal, not a product they sell, and its main move is consolidating a fragmented tool stack onto a single data model so no piece of data lives in ten places. That consolidation is what makes agents usable: a trade study a junior engineer would spend a week on, such as belt versus pneumatic conveyance for a material-handling problem, can be delegated to a large language model grounded in the project’s own data, vendor spec sheets and simulation tools, then handed back to the engineer who asked. His explanation for why incumbents have not built this is the incentive argument again, that a contractor has no reason to want software which reduces its billable hours, the way a law firm does not.

04What you need to know first

EPC
Engineering, procurement and construction bundled into one contractor. The developer hands over design, supply chain and building in a single contract, which is also how it loses control of the decisions that drive cost.
Cost-plus, fixed-firm and change orders
Cost-plus pays the contractor a margin on actual cost. Fixed-firm names a price against a defined scope, and anything ruled outside that scope becomes a change order priced mid-project, when the developer has little leverage.
Front-end engineering design and final investment decision
Front-end design narrows the cost estimate enough to finance, typically to about plus or minus 10%. Final investment decision is when the money is committed.
Bulks
The commodity materials and equipment bought in quantity, such as steel and wire. You cannot order or hedge them until the design says what they are.

05Details worth keeping

  • Of the six to nine months a data center design occupies on the critical path, almost none goes to optimization, value engineering, designing around long-lead items, or designing for constructability. Speed is the main pitch Modon makes to that market.
  • Kann’s repeatability spectrum, which Modon accepts: utility-scale solar and storage at the repeatable end, where hundreds of near-identical projects exist; first-of-a-kind facilities at the other; data centers in between, because the powered shell repeats while the interior does not. Modon adds that interior changes trickle outward into the facility itself.
  • The fragmented tool stack spans separate software for design, hand calculations, simulation, redline review, drafting handoff and vendor management.
  • Meetings are recorded, and the recording itself generates tasks for the agents, so an offhand “what if we used a different material here” becomes a delegated trade study.
  • On subcontractors, the long-term intent is to vertically integrate as far as possible, because that is where incentives can be fixed end to end. For early projects they work with local general contractors and trades, relying on deeper design definition to ask for firm prices against a scope that is actually defined.
  • The episode is pegged to the company emerging from stealth with a $12 million raise, which appears in the show notes and is not discussed on air.

06Claims worth citing

All figures as stated on 2025-12-11 and attributed to the speaker. Claims about the company’s own contracting model describe an approach it intends to use, not results it has achieved.

  • Engineering is 3% to 10% or 15% of total project cost. Stated loosely as a range, so treat the upper bound as soft. Modon
  • Conceptual design gives about plus or minus 50% cost certainty; front-end engineering design gets to about plus or minus 10%. Modon
  • At final investment decision with a plus or minus 10% estimate, a typical project is only about 30% through its engineering. Modon
  • Project costs run from about $100 million at the small end to billions at the large end. Modon
  • The design phase of a data center project currently consumes six to nine months of critical path. Modon
  • The company writes contracts with no change orders, and intends to purchase all bulk materials on the day a project is funded or else hedge the exposure. Modon, describing his own company
  • Engineering, procurement and construction is a high-volume, low-margin business. (Kann, agreed by Modon, who adds that engineering margin specifically is small because engineering spend is small)
  • Industry engineering software has not changed much in roughly 20 years. Modon
  • Solar module costs have fallen much faster than installed costs, so the construction and commodity side has not seen the same learning. Kann, accepted by Modon
  • First completed project hoped for by the end of 2026. Modon

07Where it’s contested

  • This is a founder describing a company that has not yet built anything. No completed project, no cost or schedule results, no named customer. Every performance figure is a design target for a business model, which is normal at this stage and worth holding in mind before repeating any of it as established.
  • Kann steelmans the incumbent structure, and it is not refuted. He points to the lag between signing a contract and procuring commodities six, twelve or eighteen months later, to volatile materials prices, and to labor cost and availability. Modon agrees the complexity is real and that the contracts evolved as risk mitigation, then locates the fault in incentives anyway.
  • Kann’s first theory of the business model is wrong and gets corrected. He proposes that higher margins from cheaper delivery provide the buffer to absorb overruns. Modon says no: engineering margin is small relative to construction scope, and the buffer is supposed to come from 100% design definition.
  • The hedging answer is thin, and the subcontractor answer is partly ducked. Kann calls buying or hedging all the steel on the day of financial close “complex” and gets no detail on how that works project by project. He also asks whether the no-change-order structure flows down to subcontractors, and gets long-term vertical integration plus “a handful of different ways” in the meantime.
  • The load-bearing assumption is asserted rather than evidenced. Everything depends on AI dropping engineering’s marginal cost enough to make 100% definition before commitment both affordable and fast. Modon describes the platform but gives no numbers on cost per design hour, cycle time, or how much of the design work the agents actually carry.

Cite as: “Can AI revolutionize EPC?,” The Energy Transition for the Rest of Us, note on Catalyst with Shayle Kann, December 11, 2025. CC BY 4.0. View the Markdown