Catalyst N° 100 of 125 12 Mar 2026
AI scaling pathways: On grid, on edge, off grid, off planet
with Jake Elder, senior vice president of research and innovation, Energy Impact Partners
In this note
The question
If demand for compute keeps climbing, which ways of siting and powering data centers can actually scale: large grid-connected sites, small sites at the edge, off-grid sites, or data centers in orbit?
The answer
Mostly the boring one. Elder’s ten-year guess is that grid-connected hyperscale still holds 50% to 60% of all operating compute, with another 10% to 15% built off grid in a hyperscale-like format, roughly 15% at the edge and 5% to 10% in space. Kann would shift share toward off grid and away from edge, which neither has been able to build a case for despite trying. The exercise is conditional on two assumptions they state and then set aside: that compute demand keeps scaling, and that no large efficiency breakthrough changes the paradigm.
03The argument
The incumbent path has three constraints, unequal in difficulty. Elder names physical grid capacity and deliverability, power quality, and social license to operate, pointing to blanket bans in some states and projects pulled years after announcement. Kann rates power quality the most manageable, since it is an engineering problem, and social license the most underappreciated. On capacity Kann separates two problems people conflate: generation equipment, transformers, switchgear and substation upgrades sit in a rough three-to-seven-year window, bad but finite, while new interregional transmission is, in his phrasing, essentially infinite years, because it largely is not happening. That matters because transmission is the constraint unique to this pathway. Going off grid still leaves you waiting for turbines and transformers; it only escapes the poles and wires. One clarification to carry: the behind-the-meter generation now being built at data centers is almost entirely hybrid, sites that are grid-connected or intend to be, and close to none of it is true off-grid operation.
Edge is where the episode sets up an intuition and knocks it down twice. The first-principles case is latency, and both conclude it is a red herring: the standard example cuts the other way, since a Waymo makes its driving decisions in the car and its calls to the cloud are not so latency-bound that a regional hyperscale site fails. The second case is cost, usually argued from cheap land at a substation or commercial property, but land is a very small share of a fully loaded data center, where the money is in GPUs, the building and labor, and a small site is subscale against a 300-megawatt one. Strip both away and what remains is speed: a site provisioned for five megawatts and drawing two can absorb three more without waiting for a system upgrade. But matching a single 300-megawatt development means a hundred successful site evaluations rather than one, and neither speaker has seen that demonstrated. Elder calls it frustrating because edge looks like it should be the right answer.
Off grid relaxes almost everything at once, which is why Kann finds it the most underrated option: land is not scarce, siting can avoid communities that do not want data centers, and a study Elder cites found over a terawatt of opportunity in the American Southwest alone. What stops it is that the grid absorbs shocks. Islanded, you build that absorber yourself, meaning inertia, fault response and black-start capability, and very few people know how to run a gigawatt-scale grid. Early anecdotal data, mostly from bridge-power projects, is that they are not holding even 90% uptime. Elder’s refinement is the useful part: 90% may be tolerable if you know when the missing 10% falls, and intolerable if it lands at random inside long training runs. He also notes that grid operators cannot yet manage the voltage swings and harmonic distortion from data centers while those are a small share of load, which is a bad sign for managing them when they are the only load. Kann’s counterweight is that five nines is partly a legacy of cloud service contracts, while engineering to it off grid means overbuilding generation and storage, at a cost that matters for a ten-billion-dollar asset.
Orbital gets taken seriously and still loses on cost. Both say plainly they do not believe Musk’s claim that space will be the cheapest compute within three or four years, and neither calls the idea insane. Heat rejection, the objection people reach for first, is real but not the killer, because heat radiates with the fourth power of temperature and chips keep getting denser and hotter. The harder problems are debris, since a gigawatt-scale orbiting asset is roughly four square kilometers of radiator and solar, and maintenance, since a failed GPU that an engineer swaps in near-real time on the ground stays broken in orbit. The economic case rests on free power, but energy is only 5% to 15% of an AI data center’s cost, chips cost the same either way and maintenance costs more. So the case for orbital is not that it is cheap; it is that Earth may not allow building fast enough. That sets up the comparison Kann says he rarely hears made. Off grid’s rate limiter is the supply chain for generation and electrical equipment, orbital’s is Starship launch cadence, and standing up a couple hundred gigawatts a year of turbine manufacturing seems to him more plausible than five Starship launches a day. Elder’s pushback is the episode’s strongest objection and it is not technical: would society tolerate 200-plus gigawatts a year of new gas infrastructure for twenty years, which is Musk’s own carbon argument? Kann answers that you could be maximalist on solar and storage, geothermal and nuclear instead. Elder half-concedes, then adds the constraint above both pathways, semiconductor fabrication, which he is confident cannot supply that build rate and so probably binds first. That points him to off grid moving faster, and leaves Kann surprised not that anyone would go to space but that they would skip the terrestrial waypoint on the way.
04What you need to know first
- Behind the meter versus off grid
- Behind-the-meter generation sits on the customer’s side of the utility connection, so a data center can have a lot of it and still be grid-connected. Truly off grid means no connection at all, a different engineering problem and, per this episode, still rare.
- The grid as shock absorber
- A connected site borrows the whole system’s inertia, fault response and restart capability. An islanded site provides all of it itself, which is the core difficulty of going off grid.
- Five nines
- 99.999% uptime, the standard the cloud industry promised its customers, or roughly five minutes of downtime a year. Whether AI workloads need it is an open question here.
05Details worth keeping
- Elder splits edge into three things: inference moving onto devices such as phones and vehicles; 15-to-30-megawatt sites that look like small hyperscale builds placed where power arrives sooner; and deployments of 100 kilowatts to a few megawatts at substations or in office basements. Kann defines edge for the forecast as anything under roughly 50 megawatts.
- Going off grid may partly dodge the turbine queue, because redundancy pushes you toward many small units, such as one-megawatt reciprocating engines and smaller aeroderivative turbines, rather than one 500-megawatt combined-cycle plant. Redundancy can also mean two separate fuel supplies, including two gas pipelines, which constrains siting and adds cost.
- Siting is broadening fast. Kann says tier-one markets such as Northern Virginia, Chicago, Phoenix and Atlanta were once expected to take 90% of new demand, and speed to power is now pulling development toward West Texas, though workforce, electricians and water still matter.
- Latency is worse in orbit than in West Texas, so even a future that trains models in space still builds heavily on the ground.
06Claims worth citing
All figures as stated on 2026-03-12. Lead times, uptime data and anything touching launch costs move fast, and several of these are explicitly rough estimates rather than measurements.
- Interconnecting gigawatt-scale sites to new power supply runs five to seven years in many markets. Elder
- Turbines, transformers, switchgear and substation upgrades sit in a three-to- five or up-to-seven-year window; new interregional transmission is “essentially infinite years” in recent US practice. Kann
- An unnamed report put roughly 50 gigawatts of behind-the-meter generation in development at data centers, of which close to zero is true off-grid capacity. report cited by Kann
- A study co-authored by Stripe, Paces and Scale Microgrids about two years earlier found over a terawatt of off-grid opportunity in the American Southwest alone, with roughly 50% solar plus batteries at cost parity to all-gas and up to 80% or 90% solar without meaningful cost increase. Elder hedges the second figure with “I think,” and the transcript garbles “parity” as “priority.” study cited by Elder
- Early off-grid projects, mostly bridge-power sites intending to connect later, are not holding even 90% uptime. Elder calls the data anecdotal. Elder
- The International Space Station rejects under 100 kilowatts of heat with a radiator the size of a soccer field, while one high-density Nvidia rack could soon exceed 100 kilowatts; a gigawatt-scale orbital data center works out to roughly four square kilometers. Elder
- A Starlink satellite’s odds of a debris strike run a couple percent per year, implying a strike roughly every hour for a four-square-kilometer object. The analyst is rendered in the transcript as “Thunder Set Energy.” analysis cited by Elder
- Orbital solar gets about a 95% capacity factor plus better irradiance, five to ten times the energy per panel over its life, but energy is only 5% to 15% of an AI data center’s total cost. Elder
- Musk’s claims, characterized by both speakers and disbelieved by both: orbital compute cheapest within three or four years, hundreds of gigawatts of compute built per year on the same timeline, and Starship launch at about $100 per kilogram. Musk, as characterized by Kann and Elder
- Ten-year share of all operating compute: 50-60% grid-connected hyperscale, 10-15% off grid, about 15% edge, 5-10% orbital. Elder
07Where it’s contested
- The premise is assumed, not argued. Kann sets the demand question aside, saying he has nothing insightful to say about how much compute will be needed, and assumes no major efficiency gain. The shares are also sensitive to the size of the pie: a 10-terawatt answer and a 300-gigawatt answer imply different mixes.
- Edge is an open disagreement between them. Elder allocates it about 15% while calling it the least-cost and theoretically fastest option; Kann would take share from edge and a little from grid-connected hyperscale, and cannot see why edge becomes a large portion of compute. Both spent three or four months trying to convince themselves of the edge case and failed, and Kann invites listeners to try.
- Off-grid reliability is unresolved. Elder expects the engineering gets solved over time but calls it a large risk for a first mover on a ten-billion-dollar asset, and the uptime evidence behind it is anecdotal.
- Orbital timing is left deliberately vague. Elder agrees it is not the cheapest option before 2030, then says whether it arrives in five years or 500 he is not sure. Both frame orbital as not insane and its technical problems as not obviously insurmountable, which is weaker than either endorsement or dismissal.
- Whether society accepts the gas buildout off grid implies. Elder raises it as the strongest argument for going to space and Kann counters with clean firm alternatives; neither resolves it. Elder also suspects developers remain sensitive to location, while Kann thinks that constraint is loosening in real time.
- Chips as the real ceiling. Elder does not know how many chips a couple hundred gigawatts a year translates into, only that fabrication capacity today cannot do it, so the binding constraint may sit upstream of this whole framework.