Catalyst N° 045 of 125 6 Jan 2025
Lithium’s wild ride
with Ernest Scheyder, senior correspondent, Reuters, and author of The War Below
In this note
The question
Lithium prices rose steeply and then crashed. What actually caused each half of that, and what decides where the market goes next?
The answer
The run-up, roughly 2021 into 2022, was an expectations story that ran ahead of supply. The crash came when supply arrived faster than demand grew, and it is being held down by Chinese-linked producers who keep producing rather than curtail. Scheyder is explicit that demand did not fail; it simply rose more slowly than what got priced in. He offers no price forecast, and says the variable that now matters most to this industry is government policy.
03The argument
Lithium does not behave like oil, and the reason matters before any price discussion. It comes from two physically different sources, brine and hard rock, and yields two chemicals that are not interchangeable. More of the world’s lithium today comes from hard rock, both because it is faster than waiting months for brine to evaporate and because hydroxide, the higher-performing and pricier chemical, is easier to make from spodumene, while brine gives you carbonate and needs an extra step to convert it. Kann’s reading is that this breaks the usual commodity logic, in which a single cost curve gets cut wherever the price lands and the marginal producer shuts in. Scheyder adds a second complication: there is not even one price. Retail investors watch the Chinese spot price for lithium carbonate as a proxy, many contracts do not track it, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange has begun trading lithium and the London Metal Exchange plans to.
With that said, here is the cycle. Prices rose sharply into a peak that Kann places around 2021 and Scheyder agrees is right around there. The only price level named in the entire episode is Kann’s recollection that the Chinese spot price reached “the $80,000 range,” which Scheyder answers with no more than “that sounds familiar.” Scheyder’s account of the run-up is about expectation rather than physical shortage: 2021 was the first full year of the pandemic, with unusual attention on what a future electrified economy would need; the Inflation Reduction Act followed in 2022; retail investors piled into junior miners globally and equity valuations surged; consultants and analysts published steep demand projections. Crucially, not much new supply had arrived yet. Then, in the ensuing years, a great deal of it did, and by the January 2025 recording prices were, in Kann’s words, way below the peak. No figure is given for where they sat at recording.
The turn is that this is not a demand-failure story, however easily it reads as one. Scheyder says plainly that demand for lithium continues to rise and that more people keep buying electric vehicles. What changed sits on the supply side and in strategic behavior. There is a glut across both carbonate and hydroxide, and Chinese-linked producers are raising output or declining to curtail, effectively operating at a loss in what he calls a transparent bid for market share. China is simultaneously lifting domestic production from lepidolite, a source rock with a higher cost curve, environmental problems and opaque production data, and Chinese companies are mining hard rock in parts of Africa. The consequence is that Western producers do the curtailing instead. Expansion plans get shelved, and spending a billion or two on a refinery stops appealing to investors. Kann notes that a Portuguese refinery Galp had planned with Northvolt was cancelled the week of recording, though Scheyder adds that Northvolt had problems of its own. Low prices therefore do not merely squeeze margins; they entrench exactly the concentration that Western policy was built to dilute. The one concession Scheyder makes on the demand side is careful and worth keeping intact: expectations have been tempered relative to 2021 and 2022, and he now expects a larger continuing role for a petroleum-based economy in the mix. That is a hedge, not a reversal.
Which is why his closing answer is about Washington rather than geology. Mining has historically been a politically conservative industry and is now increasingly dependent on industrial policy, in a way he thinks oil and gas are not. Evidence that US policy is working is anecdotal so far, the clearest case being Quebec graphite miners charging a premium for North American material to battery makers chasing the vehicle tax credit, which helps graphite producers and hurts an electric vehicle industry already on thin margins. The technology hope, direct lithium extraction, he deliberately deflates: it has never worked at commercial scale, it is an umbrella term covering several approaches, and because every brine differs in chemistry the technology has to be tailored to each deposit, so cracking it in Arkansas proves nothing about Chile or Germany. He expects no single winner and no overnight fix, and says the answers he is waiting for come from policy after January 20th.
04What you need to know first
- Brine versus hard rock
- The two sources of lithium. Brine is salty water, rich in lithium alongside calcium and magnesium, concentrated over months in evaporation ponds that only work somewhere it does not rain; it dominates in western South America. Hard rock, usually the mineral spodumene, is blasted, hauled and crushed like any other mine, and is found in Australia, the eastern United States and parts of Africa.
- Lithium carbonate versus lithium hydroxide
- The two intermediate chemicals that go on to batteries. Hydroxide is higher-performing and more expensive; carbonate is the more basic product. Brine yields carbonate first, hard rock goes more directly to hydroxide.
- Direct lithium extraction
- Filtering lithium out of brine, loosely like a household water softener pulling metals from drinking water, rather than evaporating the water away. Scheyder describes it as never yet proven at commercial scale.
- Spot price versus contract price
- Most lithium does not change hands at the headline Chinese spot price for carbonate, which is why “the lithium price” is an unreliable phrase and why a single quoted number should always be traced to its benchmark.
05Details worth keeping
- The Atacama evaporation ponds run to hundreds of acres and photograph as different shades of cyan and purple, each pond a chemical step removing a different metal from the brine.
- Lithium was a niche mineral until the lithium-ion battery. Mid-century uses included the atomic industry, which is part of why a US lithium industry grew up in North Carolina with Albemarle and Arcadium as its legacies, along with pharmaceuticals, greases and glass.
- On Chile, Scheyder was in Santiago the night President Boric announced steps toward nationalizing the lithium industry. The two incumbent producers in the Atacama salt flat are Albemarle, whose contract runs to at least around 2040, and SQM, whose phases out in 2030 and which therefore had far more at stake. SQM has since struck a deal with the state miner Codelco covering other salt flats and folding in its Atacama operations. Rio Tinto said the day before recording that it wants to partner with Codelco too.
- The Smackover formation in Arkansas is a huge underground brine body that has produced bromine for decades. Exxon’s concept there is to drill another pipe, filter out the lithium and reinject the brine. Koch Industries, Equinor and Occidental Petroleum are investing in this area too, alongside startups and government-backed scientists.
- Direct lithium extraction runs into water politics. Utah’s legislature blocked its development on the shrinking Great Salt Lake, citing tourism and the state economy, and a company responded by pulling out and closing its whole lithium division. Texas, by contrast, has no rules governing lithium extraction at all.
- Oilfield produced water is a possible lithium source but a thin one, since far more volume has to be filtered for the same output. Its appeal is turning a disposal cost into a revenue line.
06Claims worth citing
All figures as stated on 2025-01-06. Prices especially: note that the episode contains exactly one price level, it is loose, and it refers to the 2021-2022 peak rather than to the market at the time of recording.
- Prices rose steeply into a peak Kann places around 2021 and Scheyder agrees is “right around there,” then crashed over the following years, and at the January 2025 recording sat “way below” that peak. No figure is given for the level at recording, and neither speaker forecasts a price. Kann and Scheyder
- The peak level: Kann recalls the Chinese spot price reaching “the $80,000 range” and Scheyder replies only that it sounds familiar. The unit is never stated, presumably per metric ton of lithium carbonate, no month is attached, and the guest neither sourced nor independently confirmed it. Treat it as the host’s recollection, not a reported figure. Kann, loosely assented to by Scheyder
- There is no single lithium price. The Chinese spot price for lithium carbonate is the usual stand-in; many contracts do not reflect it; the Chicago Mercantile Exchange has begun trading lithium and the London Metal Exchange plans to. Scheyder
- More of the world’s lithium now comes from hard rock than from brine, on speed and on the ease of making hydroxide from spodumene. Scheyder
- Australia is the world’s largest lithium producer, on hard rock; Chile is the world’s largest brine producer. The specific ranking of Chile as second largest overall is Kann’s, unchallenged by Scheyder, who calls it one of the largest. Scheyder and Kann
- China is the world’s largest processor of lithium, and much Australian and Chilean output is shipped to mainland China for processing. Albemarle, the world’s largest lithium company, has many processing plants there and bought several more a year or two ago, driven by Chinese demand. Scheyder
- Chinese-linked producers are raising or maintaining output and effectively operating at a loss in a bid for market share, forcing Western producers to curtail expansion plans. Scheyder
- China is increasing domestic production from lepidolite, which carries a higher cost curve, environmental concerns and opaque production data, and Chinese companies are also mining hard rock in parts of Africa. Scheyder
- Albemarle’s Chilean contract runs to at least around 2040 to 2042; SQM’s phases out in 2030. Scheyder
- Exxon Mobil has invested more than $100 million in direct lithium extraction at the Smackover formation in Arkansas, and helped invent the lithium-ion battery in the early 1980s. Scheyder
- Direct lithium extraction has never worked at commercial scale, and there are at least four or five more prominent technical approaches under the label. Scheyder
- Lithium concentration runs about 10 to 100 parts per million in oilfield produced water against 1,000 or higher in Chile. Scheyder
- Graphite is the largest metal by volume in an electric vehicle battery and goes into the anode; China is the world’s largest producer; Quebec miners are charging premiums for North American graphite to battery makers seeking the vehicle tax credit. Scheyder
- The Inflation Reduction Act had been law a little more than two years at recording, and the evidence that it is shifting sourcing is anecdotal. Scheyder
- Republicans approach critical minerals through a national security lens and Democrats through a climate lens, arriving at the same goal by different routes. Scheyder
07Where it’s contested
- Whether this is a demand story. The framing around the episode invites reading the crash as electric vehicle demand disappointing. Scheyder says the opposite of the strong version: demand for lithium continues to rise and more people keep buying electric vehicles. His qualification is that expectations have been tempered relative to 2021 and 2022 and that he expects a bigger continuing petroleum mix. Keep both halves; dropping either one misreports him.
- The peak price number belongs to the host, and Scheyder had just finished explaining that no single lithium price exists, which makes his loose assent to it doubly worth flagging.
- The guest corrects the host on policy intent. Kann describes the Inflation Reduction Act as designed to move battery supply chains out of China; Scheyder draws the distinction that it was designed to increase production in the United States rather than to punish China.
- How much Chile’s nationalization actually changed. Kann reads it as having turned out not very disruptive. Scheyder partly resists: the plan has not passed the legislature, Boric is not standing again, and his answer is that we watch and wait.
- Who holds the majority in Chile is left unclear. Kann says Codelco must own a majority of any lithium project. Scheyder’s own phrasing was that a state-backed company would partner with private entities “in a minority role,” which does not resolve which side holds the minority. He does not correct Kann, so the ownership split is not established here.
- The cost curve model is the host’s, unconfirmed. Kann lays out brine as the low-cost, carbonate-first resource and Australian hard rock as higher-cost but hydroxide-ready, and offers it for correction. Scheyder neither confirms nor corrects it and moves to refining.
- Direct lithium extraction gets deliberately deflated. Not a magic bullet, in his words, and he singles out retail investors who assume the first company to crack it wins everything.
- He declines to forecast. No price call, and on policy he repeatedly says he does not know, deferring to what happens after January 20th. The lepidolite production data being opaque also means China’s true supply contribution is not well established even in his account.